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conceivably might institute some type of review under a "clear and
present danger" theory. Certainly, any school may take steps to deal
with an emergency situation.65 It would seem that even the student
in Fujishima who distributed literature during a fire drill might have
been punished on the grounds of improper conduct during the drill,
unless it could be shown that other students distributing nonpolitical
literature were not so reprimanded.
In order to preserve first amendment rights in such situations, and
to clarify the parameters of school authority, definite standards are
needed to avoid the implementation of ad hoc regulations which
might develop. The court in Fujishima might have directed educa-
tional authorities to define the conditions which would give a school
sufficient cause to implement a regulated system of prior review. The
ideal standard would have both administrators and students aware
of the extent of school authority and student responsibility.
Since controversial literature to which school officials may object
is often more symptomatic than causative of discontent, stifling the
outlets for such dissatisfaction can result in problems more serious
than any controversy initiated by the expression of opinions. The
school's policy should be to foster bilateral debate and responsible
criticism. Only where the atmosphere warrants particular caution is
a system of prior review a justifiable means of maintaining order.
MICHELE 0. HEFFERNAN'
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-NONTENURED STATE UNIVERSITY
PROFESSOR NOT ENTITLED TO PROTECTION OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
UPON NONRENEWAL OF CONTRACT.
ItJanuary 1969, David E. Roth, a nontenured assistant profes-
sor at a state university was notified that he would not be rehired after
his one-year contract expired. No reasons were given, and no hearing
was offered concerning his nonrenewal. He brought suit in a United
States district court, alleging that the university's action deprived 'him
of both substantive and procedural rights under the fourteenth amend-
ment.1 The plaintiff claimed that the decision was in retaliation 'for
65. See Sullivan v. Houston Ind. School Dist., 333 F. Supp. 1149, 1170 (S.D., Tex.
1971),
1. Roth v. Board of Regents of State Colleges, 310 F. Supp. 972 (W.D. Wis. 1970).
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his criticism of the university administration, thus violating his righ't
to freedom of speech. He also alleged that the failure of the university
to advise him of the reasons for his nonretention and to provide a
hearing violated his right to procedural due process. The district
court granted summary judgment for the plaintiff on the procedural
issue, ordering the university officials to furnish him with a statement
of the reasons for their failure to retain him and to provide him with
a hearing. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed,2
but on appeal this decision was reversed by the Supreme Court. Held:
in the absence of any charges against him, stigma, or disability fore-
closing other employment opportunities, the respondent was not de-
nied "liberty," and the terms of his employment did not accord him
any "property" interest in continued employment. Therefore, his
nonretention did not deprive him of any interests protected by pro-
cedural due process. Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564 (1972).8
Although the Supreme Court has "consistently recognized that
• . . the interest of a government employee in retaining his job, can
be summarily denied, ' 4 there are important exceptions to this rule.
A teacher may not be terminated or refused employmeht in viola-
tion 'of basic constitutional rights, such as the right of free speech,5
freedom of association," or the privilege against self-incrimination.7
The Court has also held that the government may not exclude a per-
son from employment for reasons that are patently arbitrary.8 Simi-
2. Roth v. Board of Regents of State Colleges, 446 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1971)..
3. Hereinafter cited as instant case.
4. Cafeteria Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 896-97 (1961), citing
Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 539 (1959). In Vitarelli, an Interior Department em-
ployee who had not qualified for statutory protection under the Civil Service Act, 5
U.S.C. § 7532 (1970), "could have been summarily discharged by the Secretary at any
time without the giving of a reason .... ." Id. See also Taylor v. Becklham, 178 U.S. 548,
577 (1900) ; Crenshaw v. United States, 134 U.S. 99, 104 (1890).
5. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
6. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
-7. Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
8. Cafeteria Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 898 (1961). At one
time, the courts were able to use the so-called right-privilege distinction to hold that
because public employment was a privilege, not a right, a person had to accept it under
the conditions offered-even if those conditions infringed upon his constitutional rights.
This ruling was undermined over the years, and in 1971 the Supreme Court "rejected
the concept that constitutional rights turn upon whether a government benefit is char-
acterized as a 'right' or as a 'privilege.'" Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374
(1971). See generally, Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in
Constitutional Law, 81 HAv. L. REv. 1439 (1968).
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larly, a state may not foreclose a range of employment possibilities to
a person 9 or injure his reputation by its actions.10
In addition to liberty interests, the fourteenth amendment also
extends to the protection of property interests. Thus, the government
may not arbitrarily terminate employment at will where statutes, rules,
or contractual agreements specify grounds for dismissal or nonrenewal
or require certain procedures to be followed. Under this reasoning
courts have protected a public college professor's interest in employ-
ment as defined by tenure provisions,1 a nontenured noncontracted
teacher's clearly implied promise of continued employment,1 2 and
a welfare recipient's interest in continued receipt of benefits. 13 How-
ever, while public employees have been given substantive protec-
tion of constitutional rights, pretermination procedural due process
has not been accorded to protect these substantive rights. Since the
government has not been required to state the grounds for dismissal
or nonretention, it has been difficult for plaintiffs to establish that
the reasons were constitutionally impermissible. This anomaly led
Mr. Justice Brennan to state:
Such a result in effect nullifies the substantive right-not to be
arbitrarily injured by government-which the Court purports to
recognize. What sort of right is it which enjoys absolutely no proce-
dural protection?14
9. The Court has held that a "State cannot exclude a person from the practice of
law or from any other occupation in a manner or for reasons that contravene the Due
Process or Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Schware v. Board
of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 238-39 (1957), citing Dent v. State of West Virginia, 129
U.S. 114 (1889). Cf. Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956); Wie-
man v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952). In a similar case the Supreme Court held
that a state could not withhold a license to practice law without providing the applicant
with a full prior hearing. Willner v. Committee on Character and Fitness, 373 U.S. 96
(1963).
10. The Supreme Court established that
certainly where the State attaches "a badge of infamy" to the citizen, due
process comes into play.
Where a person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake
because of what the government is doing to him, notice and an opportunity
to be heard are essential.
Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971), citing Wieman v. Updegraff,
344 U.S. 183, 191 (1952); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S.
123 (1951).
11. Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
12. Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207 (1971).
13. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
14. Cafeteria Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 900 (1961) (dissenting
opinion).
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The balancing process is the traditional due process test which
has been utilized by the Supreme Court. Thus, the Court has at-
tempted to weigh the private interest affected by governmental ac-
tion against the countervailing governmental interest to determine
what form of due process, if any, the private individual was entitled
to in a specific case.15 This balancing process was employed in light
of the realization that
'[d]ue process" is an elusive concept. Its exact boundaries are
undefinable, and its content varies according to specific factual con-
texts .... Whether the Constitution requires that a particular right
obtain in a specific proceeding depends upon a complexity of fac-
tors. The nature of the alleged right involved, the nature of the
proceeding, and the possible burden on that proceeding, are all
considerations to be taken into account. 16
In Cafeteria Workers Local 473 v. McElroy,17 the Supreme Court
utilized the balancing process to determine the form of procedural
due process an individual was entitled to before the actions of the
government deprived that individual of government employment. In
this case the government's revocation of the security clearance of a
short order cook resulted in her loss of employment on a military
installation. The Court indicated the need for balancing when it
stated that
[c]onsideration of what procedures due process may require under
any given set of circumstances must begin with a determination
of the precise nature of the government function involved as well
as the private interest that has been affected by governmental ac-
tion.'8
The private interest involved was the denial of "the opportunity to
work at one isolated and specific military installation."' 9 The govern-
ment had a proprietary interest in managing an important federal
military installation2 0 The Court found that since there was no
damage to the employee's reputation, and since the government ac-
tion would not foreclose other employment opportunities, the gov-
ernmental interest outweighed the private interest. Therefore, the
15. Id. at 895.
16. Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960). See also Joint Anti-Fascist
Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162-63 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
17. 367 U.S. 886 (1961).
18. Id. at 895.
19. Id. at 896.
20. Id.
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Court held that the individual was not entitled to procedural pro-
tection.21
Three years prior to Cafeteria Workers, in a case which also in-
volved removal of a security clearance, the Court indicated that the
employee was entitled to the due process protection of notification
of the reasons for dismissal and a hearing.22 There, however, the effect
was to foreclose a range of employment opportunities, since most of
the jobs in his profession were within military installations. The pri-
vate interest was held to outweigh the same proprietary interest of
the government in managing a military establishment. 23
In deciding whether a nontenured teacher has a right to a state-
ment of reasons or a hearing upon nonrenewal of his contract, the cir-
cuit courts have come to varying conclusions. Several recent decisions
have indicated that neither procedural safeguard is required.24 The
Eighth Circuit has held that as long as a teacher has not shown that his
ionrenewal is based on a constitutionally impermissible infringement
of his rights, then absent any statutory or contractual provision, "[t]he
board [of education] has the absolute right to decline to employ or
re-employ any applicant for any reason whatever or for no reason at
all."12 5 The Fifth Circuit has indicated that both procedural safe-
guards are required only if the teacher can show that he had an ex-
pectancy of continued employment.26
In Drown v. Portsmouth School District,27 which involved the
nonrenewal of a probationary teacher's contract, the First Circuit
21. Id. at 898-99.
22. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
23. Id. Concerning the methodology of the Supreme Court in procedural due process
cases, one writer has commented as follows:
The formulation of degrees of pretermination due process immediately
responsive to the very particular facts of each case does . . . accurately reflect
the Supreme Court's method of constitutional analysis of such matters.
[he degree of pretermination procedural due process to which a public
employee is entitled is most heavily influenced by the degree of total hardship
which may ensue as a consequence of that termination.
Van Alstyne, The Constitutional Rights of Teachers and Professors, 1970 DuKa L.J.
841, 874, 866 (1970). In 1970, the Court reaffirmed the use of the balancing process in
holding that all welfare recipients were entitled to procedural protection prior to termi-
-nation of benefits. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
24. Orr v. Trinter, 444 F.2d 128 (6th Cir. 1971); Jones v. Hopper, 410 F.2d
1323 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 991 (1970); Freeman v. Gould Special
School Dist., 405 F.2d 115 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 843 (1969).
25. Freeman v. Gould Special School Dist., 405 F.2d 1153, 1158 (8th Cir. 1969),
-quoting 47 Am. JuR. Schools § 114 (1943).
26. Ferguson v. Thomas, 430 F.2d 852, 856 (5th Cir. 1970).
27. 435 F.2d 1182 (lst Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 972 (1971).
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adopted a balancing test and concluded that the teacher had a right
to a list' of reasons, but not to a hearing.28 The court found that the
interests of the teacher included the opportunity to protect a personal
and financial investment in preparation, correct false information, im-
prove personal deficiencies, and minimize any negative effect on future
employment opportunities.29 On the other hand, the court determined
that the school board had an interest in retaining its ability to insure
the quality of the school system by employing teachers for a proba-
tionary period.30 The court concluded that requiring the school board
to state its reasons for not rehiring a nontenured teacher would not
impose a significant administrative burden, nor would it significantly
inhibit the ability of the school board to rid itself of incompetent
teachers.8 ' However, the court was unwilling to go so far as to require
a hearing for nontenured probationary teachers, holding that such a
procedure would place an excessive burden upon the school board.3
The district court and the court of appeals in the instant case felt
compelled to follow the balancing process of Cafeteria Workers.3 The
state university's interest was in retaining its ability to assemble the
best possible faculty.3 4 The university felt that unfettered discretion
was necessary to attain this objective:. 5 Balanced against this 'was
Rlbth's interest in eliminating the adverse effect nonretention w'as
likely to have on his career.3 6 The lower courts indicated ihat,in
balance, Roth was entitled to procedural protections which were de-
signed to safeguard his right against arbitrary dismissal.3 7 The district
court considered the decision to be consistent with the demise of the
concept that public employment was a privilege. 88 The court of ap-
28. -Id. In addition the teacher was accorded access to administrative evaluations
of his performance.
29. Id. at 1184.
3p. Id.
,31. Id. at 1185, The court noted that statutes already require this in several states,
citifik, e.g., WASH. RYv. COD, ANN. § 28.67.070 (1964).
32. Id.
33. Roth v. Board of Regents of State Colleges, 310 F. Supp. 972, 977, 979 (W.D.
Wis. 1970) ; Roth v. Board of Regents of State Colleges, 446 F.2d 806, 808-09 (7th Cir.
1971 ). The Supreme Court's opinion in the instant case is primarily compared and con-
trasted herein with that of the lower courts. The writer felt that it would he more
valuable than a comparison with the dissenting opinions in the instant case. While the
dissenting opinions contain most of the relevant arguments, it was felt that the lower
courts presented them in a manner which lent them more readily to this analysis.
34. 310 F. Supp. at 975; 446 F.2d at 809.
35. Id.
'6. 446 F.2d at 809.
37. 310 F. Supp. at 979-80.
38. Id. at 979.
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peals noted that in cases such as Roth, involving "a background of
controversy and unwelcome expressions of opinion,"89 the requirement
of prior notice and a hearing serves as a prophylactic against viola-
tions of a teacher's constitutional rights.
The Supreme Court indicated that a weighing process is correctly
utilized in determining the form of procedural due process required
in particular situations. 40 But whether or not any due process is re-
quired depends upon "the nature of the interest at stake." 41 That is,
the interest must be "encompassed within the Fourteenth Amendment's
protection of liberty and property." Following a discussion of previ-
ous cases, the Court held that the state had not made any charges
against Roth which placed his "'good name, reputation, honor or in-
tegrity at stake.' -43 They further reasoned that the state's decision not
to rehire him did not place a liberty interest in jeopardy.4 4 The Court
found that Roth did not have a property interest at stake because
the terms of his one-year appointment, which defined his property
interest, were not violated.45 Thus, the majority concluded that Roth
was not entitled to any form of procedural protection.
Neither of the two dissenting opinions disputed the Court's
method of analysis, but they did differ with the majority's definitions
of liberty and property interests. Mr. Justice Marshall, for example,
would have gone much further in defining those interests. 4 He con-
39. 446 F.2d at 810. Mr. Justice Douglas, in his dissent, indicated that he also
would require a statement of reasons and a hearing upon an allegation that first amend-
ment rights were violated. Instant case at 582.
40. The Court cited past decisions to indicate that a person has been granted due
process protection of "liberty interests" when a state has done the following: made
charges that might seriously damage a person's standing in the community; placed a
person's good name, reputation, or honor at stake because of what it is doing; and
imposed a stigma or other disability on a person, thereby foreclosing a range of oppor-
tunities. The Court also cited past decisions to indicate that the many forms of property
include: the interest in continued receipt of welfare benefits; the interest in continued
public employment held under tenure provisions; and even the interest created by a
clearly implied promise of continued employment. Instant case at 573-77.
The Court further indicated that property interests are "created and their dimen-
sions are defined by existing rules of understandings that stem from an independent
source such as state law-rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that
support claims of entitlement to those benefits." Instant case at 577.
41. Id. at 570-71, citingMorrisseyv. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
42. Instant case at 569.
43. Id. at 573.
44. Id. at 573-75.
45. Id. at 578.
46. Instant case at 588. Mr. Justice Brennan has indicated that he agrees in part
with Mr. Justice Marshall's Roth dissent. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 604
(1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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sidered "liberty" to be "the 'very essence of the personal freedom
and opportunity' secured by the Fourteenth Amendment." 47 In his
view, the "property" right protected by the fourteenth amendment
dictates that "every citizen who applies for a government job is en-
titled to it unless the government can establish some reason for deny-
ing the empl6yment." 4s Mr. Justice Douglas noted that "[n]onrenewal
of a teacher's contract is tantamount in effect to a dismissal," and that
this was an adverse action contemplated against Roth which entitled
him to prior notice and hearing. 9 After a brief listing of some impor-
tant interests of citizens which have been afforded procedural pro-
tection (including disqualification for unemployment insurance, de-
nial of a tax exemption, and withdrawal of welfare benefits), Mr.
Justice Douglas concluded that "[w]e should now add that nonre-
newal of a teacher's contract, whether or not he has tenure, is an en-
titlement of the same importance and dignity."50
The lower courts felt that Roth had an interest at stake,51
which would appear to fit the Supreme Court's description of "pro-
tected liberty interests." However, the majority rejected this conten-
tion on the grounds that the lower courts made an "assumption"
that the nonrenewal decision had damaged, or would damage Roth,
in his academic career.52 Thus, the Court required that the plaintiff
show that he was actually harmed,53 while the lower courts merely re-
quired that there exist a substantial probability that he was, or would
be, seriously harmed.54 The holding of the lower courts is consistent
with the Supreme Court's recent decision in Goldberg v. Kelly,55 in
which all welfare recipients were held to be entitled to a hearing
prior to termination of benefits, because they might have an interest
47. Instant case at 589.
48. Id. at 588.
49. Id. at 585.
50. Id. at 584.
51. The district court indicated what the private individual's interest in this case
was:
There can be no question that, in terms of money and standing and opportunity
to contribute to the educational process, the consequences to him probably will
be serious and prolonged and possibly will be severe and permanent.
310 F. Supp. at 979 (emphasis added).
The court of appeals, in affirming, indicated that the private interest was "the
substantial adverse effect non-retention is likely to have upon the career interests of an
individual professor .... " 446 F.2d at 809 (emphasis added).
52. Instant case at 574 n.13.
53. Id.
54. See supra note 51.
55. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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at stake. In emphasizing the nature rather than the weight of Roth's
interest, the Roth Court cited Morrissey v. Brewer,0 decided the same
day. Further, the majority cited Cafeteria Workers in support of its
statement that "[lit stretches the concept too far to suggest that a
person is deprived of 'liberty' when he simply is not rehired in one
job but remains as free as before to seek another."57 However, in this
earlier case the Court found a private interest which it balanced
against the government's interest.8 Thus, a close analysis of the ma-
jority opinion reveals that its conclusion was based primarily upon a
policy decision, rather than persuasive precedent.
As a practical matter, the thrust of the majority's holding was
much more traditional than that of the lower courts. The immediate
result of the holding is to maintain the status quo in regard to pro-
cedural due process rights of government employees. Thus, the Court
applied a conventional method of constitutional analysis-formulating
the necessary degree of procedural due process on an ad hoc basis. 0
A consequence of the decision is to delegate responsibility for pro-
tecting the rights of nontenured teachers to state legislatures, school
boards' and teacher unions. The holding also has the effect of retaining
unfettered discretion in school boards with respect to the retention or
nonretention of nontenured teachers. The majority's approach avoided
the necessity of discussing the impact that the demise of the right-
privilege distinction is to have on public employees. On a related issue,
the, holding reaffirmed the Court's pre-existing view that procedural
due process is not required to protect the individual government
employee's substantive right not to be arbitrarily harmed by the state.
Even if it were not the intent of the Court, the holding in the
instant case appears to provide the lower courts with an alternative
to the traditional balancing process. If a particular liberty or property
interest in a future case does not fall into one of the categories dis-
cussed. in Roth, a court may merely indicate that no protected interest
is at .stake, and therefore no procedural protection is required. Thus,
the 'Roth decision may, in effect, void the holding of the First Cir-
cuit in Drown v. Portsmouth School District.00 In that decision, in-
56. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
57. Instant case at 575.
58. 367 U.S. at 896.
59. Van Alstyne, The Constitutional Rights of Teachers and Professors, 1970 DuKE
L.J. 841, 874 (1970).
60. 435 F.2d 1182 (1st Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 972 (1971).
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volving the nonretention of a nontenured teacher, a number of in-
terests requiring procedural protection were found to exist. The courts
within the First Circuit may now have an option to continue to
recognize those interests or to conclude that they are no longer pro-
tected. Another result which is implicit in the Court's holding may be
to provide easier access to the courts for some nontenured teachers
who were not rehired in other teaching jobs. For exaaple, in view of
Roth, a federal judge in Chicago ruled against a school board motion
to dismiss a suit brought by two nonrenewed teachers, in order to pro-
vide them with an opportunity to show that their lack of success in
obtaining another teaching position was a result of the nonrenewal
decision.61
Although it may be the Court's prerogative, it seems incorrect for
it to avoid the traditional balancing process by attempting to establish
a restrictive definition of protected interests. It also seems incorrect
to require a person to show that he in fact has been deprived of an
interest before a court must balance to determine his procedural
rights. Since it is unconstitutional for the state university to base a
nonrenewal decision on arbitrary grounds, no grounds, or on grounds
that infringe upon specific constitutional rights, it logically follows
that there must be fair and reasonable grounds for the decision. In
balance, it would hardly impose a great burden on the state university
to be required to communicate those reasons to the person who is not
to be retained.62 While the burden upon the state of providing a
hearing for a nonrenewed teacher would be somewhat heavier than
that of providing notice of the reasons, the requirement of a hearing
is important. It has been argued that a formal hearing before a school
board which was determined to deny a continuance of employment
would be of no value, whereas an informal hearing could be ob-
tained from a board which was acting in good faith.63 The counter-
arguments are that such a hearing could lead to discovery and cor-
rection of innocent errors,6 4 and might aid a speedy resolution of
disputes.65 The procedural protection formulated by the district
61. NEA Reporter, Oct. 1972 (No. 7) at 4.
62. Instant case at 591 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Drown v. Portsmouth Special
School Dist., 435 F.2d 1182, 1184-85 (1st Cir. 1970).
63. 85 H v. L. REv. 1327, 1334-35 (1972). See instant case at 591 (Marshall,
J., dissenting); Comment, Constitutional Problems In The Nonretention of Probationary
Teachers, 1971 U. ILL. L.F. 508, 513 (1971).
64. Instant case at 591 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
65. 85 HARv. L. Rav., supra note 63, at 1333.
633
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court 0 would place the burden of proof on the teacher and would re-
spect nonrenewal decisions based upon minimal factual support and
subtle reasoning. As such, these procedures would not eliminate the
distinction between tenured and nontenured teachers, and would not
significantly hinder the school board in its efforts to maintain a
competent faculty.
Concerning the question of whether a protected interest is at
stake, it seems elementary that the nonretention of a professor will
have an adverse effect on his career. It also seems apparent from a
reading of the fourteenth amendment and past cases that all liberty
and property interests, no matter how minimal, are entitled to some
form of procedural due process protection. The balancing process is
utilized to determine what form of protection is required in each
case, and it is in this balancing that the degree of actual or probable
harm should be considered.
The majority requires that a teacher show, on a case-by-case
basis, that he has in fact been adversely affected by a nonretention
decision. Such a requirement will deny the educator his right to due
process protection prior to a deprivation of liberty or property in
many situations, because to show an adverse effect usually will require
one to wait until retention actually fails to occur. The procedural
protection formulated by the district court would have eliminated
an area of constitutional uncertainty by guaranteeing prior due process
in all teacher nonretention situations. This formulation should have
been adopted by the Supreme Court.
RUSSELL W. PETIT
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-RIGHT OF MARRIED HIGH SCHOOL
STUDENTS TO ENGAGE IN EXTRACURRICULAR ACTIVITIES.
In March 1970, the Board of Education of the Fremont City
Schools unanimously adopted a regulation, later amended and in-
cluded in its Policy Handbook, which permitted married students
to attend class but forbade them participation in school-sponsored
extracurricular activities. On January 22, 1972, Albert Davis, age 18,
married a 16-year-old girl who was allegedly carrying his child. Pursu-
ant to the adopted rule, Davis, an honor student, was removed from
the eligibility list for varsity baseball. Davis brought suit in United
66. 310 F. Supp. at 980.
